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CITATIONS TO STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 § 48-2-7
A limited partner shall not become liable
as a general partner, unless in addition
to the exercise of his rights and powers
as a limited partner he takes part in the
control of the business.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 § 48-2-10

. . . . .

A limited partner shall have the same
rights as a general partner to:
A.

Have the partnership books kept at
the principal place of business of
the partnership, and at all times to
inspect and copy any of them;
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B.

Have on demand true and full
information of all things affecting
the partnership, and a formal account
of partnership affairs whenever
circumstances render it just and
reasonable; and,

C.

Have dissolution and winding up by a
decree of court.

A limited partner shall have the right to
receive a share of the profits or other
compensation by way of income, and to the
return of his contribution as provided in
§§ 48-2-15 and 48-2-16.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 § 48-2-26

3, 8, 9, 11

A contributor, unless he is a general
partner, is not a proper party to
proceedings by or against a partnership,
except where the object is to enforce a
limited partner right against or liability
to the partnership.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23.1
(1953)
In a derivative action brought by one or
more shareholders or members to enforce a
right of a corporation or of an
unincorporated association, the
corporation or association having failed
to enforce a right which may properly be
asserted by it, the complaint shall be
verified and shall allege (1) that the
plaintiff was a shareholder or member at
the time of the transaction of which he
complains or that his share or membership
thereafter devolved on him by operation of
law, and (2) that the action is not a
collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a
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court of the United States which it would
not otherwise have. The complaint shall,
also allege with particularity the
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to
obtain the action he desires from the
director to a comparable authority and, if
necessary, from the shareholders or
members, and the reasons for his failure
to obtain the action or for not making the
effort. The derivative action may not be
maintained if it appears that the
plaintiff does not fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the
shareholders or members similarly situated
in enforcing the right of the corporation
or association. The action shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court, and notice of the
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to shareholders or members in such
manner as the court directs.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b)

...

When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct
the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination
by the court that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction
for the entry of judgment. In the absence
of such determination and direction, any
order or other form of decision,
direction, however designated, which
adjudicates fewer than all of the claims
or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties shall not terminate
the action as to any of the claims or

2
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parties, and the order or other form of
decision is subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgment
adjudicating all the claims and the rights
and liabilities of all the parties.
CITATIONS TO OTHER AUTHORITIES
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Partnerships, § 380
Annotation, 26 A.L.R. 4th 264 § 6
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1916)
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (Rev.)
§§ 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004 (1976)
Utah Limited Partnership Act, L. 1921,
Ch. 88, § 1 et se^
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the lower court err in ruling that:
1.

Utah Law does not recognize a derivative action by

limited partners of a limited partnership; and
2.

It is improper under Utah law to join derivative

claims and direct claims in the same action.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Determinative statutory provisions in the present case are
Utah Code Ann. § 4 8-2-1 et seg. (19 53) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is plaintiff's appeal from a final order certified
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
granting defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

Defendants' Motion

asserted that all plaintiffs' claims of a derivative nature
should be dismissed because a derivative action may not be
maintained on behalf of a limited partnership in Utah, and
because in any event plaintiffs incorrectly joined direct and
derivative claims in the same complaint.
Because no single reason was given for the trial court's
ruling, respondents presume that the lower court considered and
relied upon each of the grounds asserted in support of the
Motion, and address those grounds separately herein.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs Bagley Corporation and Gerald H. Bagley are
limited partners in the Jeremy, Ltd.
If 15.]

[Verified Complaint at

The Jeremy, Ltd. is a limited partnership organized

under the Utah Limited Partnership Act pursuant to a Limited
Partnership Agreement.

[Verified Complaint at If 1.]

The sole

general partner of the Jeremy, Ltd. is Jeremy Service Corporation, one of the named defendants.
If 73.]

[Verified Complaint at

Together, Bagley Corporation and Gerald H. Bagley own

more than 75% of the limited partnership units.

[Second

Amended Complaint at If 18. Cf. Verified Complaint at If 15.]
Plaintiffs Bagley Corporation and Gerald H. Bagley brought
this action alleging derivative claims as limited partners of
Jeremy, Ltd.

[Verified Complaint Claims 1-9 and 12-15.]

They

also brought several direct claims against various defendants
on behalf of themselves.

[Verified Complaint, Claims 10-11. ]

The gravamen of plaintiffs1 Complaint asserts that the general
partner of the Jeremy, Ltd. breached fiduciary duties it owes
to the limited partnership in failiiig to initiate litigation
against the other named defendants.
Complaint.]

[See generally, Verified

There is no allegation that the general partner is

insolvent, unavailable or unable to meet its obligations or
carry out the responsibilities and duties of the Jeremy, Ltd.
Respondents vigorously contest the charges of wrongdoing
made in appellants* Statement of Facts, but for purposes of
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this Motion they accept as true, as did the Trial Court, the
factual allegations in the Verified Complaint.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Although appellants analogize to the law of corporate
shareholders to argue that they enjoy a common law power to
maintain a derivative action on behalf of the limited partnership, no such power is granted by the Utah Limited Partnership
Act.

Where a statute creates an entity and grants to it

express and enumerated powers, courts cannot imply additional
powers by grafting common law rights onto the existing
statutory scheme.
This rule is particularly applicable where provisions of
the Limited Partnership Act expressly bar all but certain
specified actions by limited partners on behalf of the partnership.

To allow limited partners to initiate litigation on

behalf of the partnership permits limited partners to control
or manage partnership business, contrary to express provisions
of the Utah Limited Partnership Act.

Section 48-2-26 of the

Act expressly provides that a limited partner is not a proper
party to proceedings by or against the partnership.

It is

significant that in the sole Utah case interpreting Section
48-2-26 as a bar to derivative actions by limited partners,
this Court cites the rule that limited partners are given no
greater than those provided by statute in the Limited
Partnership Act.
-3-

Under the circumstances, plaintiffs' analogy to the law of
corporate shareholders is inapposite.

The fact that the

Legislature has specifically conferred the power to bring
derivative actions on corporate shareholders underscores that
such rights must be granted by statute to an entity created by
statute such as a corporation or limited partnership.
Further, there are substantial differences between corporate shareholders and limited partners. Most significantly, a
derivative action by corporate shareholders is needed because
the shareholder may bring suit only on behalf of the corporation and the derivative action is literally the only remedy.
By contrast, a limited partner has a number of remedies
consistent with the nature of the limited partnership that
obviate the need for a derivative action.

Particularly in this

case, plaintiffs are well protected by the Limited Partnership
Agreement and their right to bring a direct action against the
general partner.
Finally, courts that have allowed derivative actions by
limited partners have done so only where effective disability
of the general partner requires such an action by a limited
partner.

To allow the derivative action in this case would

subvert the statutory scheme by allowing the limited partner to
interfere with the business judgment of a viable, acting
general partner without any showing that the partner is unable
or wrongfully unwilling to act in behalf of the partnership.

-4-

Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs could bring a
derivative action, it has long been the law of the Utah that
due to an inherent conflict of interest, direct and derivative
claims may not be joined in the same action.

In the instant

case, plaintiffs assert personal claims for conversion and
defamation which should not and cannot be joined with
derivative claims for and on behalf of the other limited
partners.

Accordingly, plaintiffs' derivative claims were

properly dismissed.
ARGUMENT
I.

A.

UNDER UTAH LAW PLAINTIFFS CANNOT ASSERT
A DERIVATIVE CLAIM ON BEHALF OF THE
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP.

A Limited Partnership Is Created by Statute and Rights
and Privileges of Limited Partners Must Be Found In
the Utah Limited Partnership Act.

A Limited Partnership in Utah is not an amorphous development of the common law,* but is a definite legal entity created
by statute.

Utah Limited Partnerships are created under the

adaptive version of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, Utah
Code Ann. §§ 48-2-1 et. seg.—a uniform state law which has been
enacted in nearly all states without significant changes.
Although the Utah Act has detailed provisions outlining the
duties and liabilities of limited partners and specifying
powers, it contains no provisions which authorize a limited

-5-

partner to bring a derivative action.1

Rather, the rights of

a limited partner are those expressly enumerated in UCA
§ 48-2-10 which provides:
A limited partner shall have the same rights as a
general partner to:
(a) Have the partnership books kept at the
principal place of business of the partnership, and at
all times to inspect and copy any of them;
(b) Have on demand true and full information of
all things effecting the partnership, and a formal
account of partnership's affairs whenever circumstances render it just and reasonable; and
(c) Have dissolution and winding up by decree of
the court.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2-10(1) (19 53) .
The rule has long existed in Utah that where a statute
creates an entity, grants to it express and enumerated powers,
and describes the mode of their exercise, the courts cannot
imply additional powers.

Hadlock v. Callister, 85 Utah 510, 39

P.2d 1082, 1085 (1935) [Powers conferred on corporation by
statute are limited by express language of the statute].
Accordingly, appellants1 argument that this Court should
recognize the power to bring derivative actions nowhere granted

1

The fact that the Uniform Limited Partnership Act does not
give limited partners the power to act on behalf of the
partnership was made clear by its drafters. In 1976 an
amendment was proposed which would authorize derivative actions
by limited partners. See Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(rev.) §§ 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004 (1976). If the Act already
authorized such actions, the specific new provision would be
unnecessary. Significantly, the Utah Legislature has not
adopted the proposed revision.
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in the Utah Limited Partnership Act is unconvincing.2

Any

such common law power directly conflicts with the statutory
scheme and cannot be granted by the courts.
B.

A Common Law Power to Bring Derivative Actions
Conflicts With the Present Statutory Scheme Governing
Limited Partners.

In order to preserve the rights and status of limited
partners, the Act reguires that limited partners not
participate in control or management of partnership affairs.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2-7 (1953).

Under the Act, a limited

partner does not (1) hold title to the assets of the limited
partnership, (2) manage those assets, or (3) control litigation
to which the limited partnership is a party.

Wroblewski v.

Brucher, 550 F.Supp. 742, 745 (W.D. Okla. 1982).

The decision

of whether to initiate litigation against third parties is a
management decision.

To allow plaintiffs to bring this action

conflicts with the above-cited portion of the Act. 3

2

Plaintiff's analogy to corporate shareholders is invalid.
Corporate shareholders have a statutory right to bring
derivative claims. URCP 23.1; see infra at p. 10.
3

Plaintiffs action is also contrary to express provisions of
the Limited Partnership Agreement entered into by the parties
to this lawsuit. Section 8.2 of that Agreement provides: "A
limited partner shall take no part in nor interfere in any
manner with the conduct or control of the business of the
partnersip and shall have no right nor authority to act for or
bind the partnership."

-7-

Even more specifically, § 48-2-26 provides:
A contributor [limited partner], unless he is a
general partner, is not a proper party to proceedings
by or against the partnership, except where the object
is to enforce a limited partner's right against or
liability to the partnership.
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2-26 (1953).

Numerous courts have inter-

preted this section as barring derivative claims by limited
partners.

See e.g. Yale II Mining Association v. Gilliam, 582

F.Supp. 893 (W.D.Va. 1984); Browning v. Maurice B. Levien & Co.
P.C., 44 N.C. App. 701, 762 S.E.2d 355 (1980); Cole v. United
States, 502 F.Supp. 881, 884-885 (D.Or. 1980); Fox v. Sackman,
22 Wash. App. 707, 591 P.2d 855, 857 (1979); Amsler v. American
Home Assurance Co., 348 S.2d 68, 71 (Florida App. 19 77);
American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 13 Wash. App.
890, 537 P.2d 1056, 1060 (1975); Lieberman v. Atlantic Mutual
Insurance Company, 62 Wash. 2d 922, 385 P.2d 53 (1963).
In the only Utah case to address the issue, this Court read
§ 48-2-26 as barring an action by limited partners on behalf of
the partnership against third parties.

In Empire Investment

Corp. & Associates v. Nielson Construction Co., 508 P.2d 804
(Utah, 1973), limited partners brought suit on behalf of the
partnership against sellers of real property after the sellers
repossessed the property.

Dismissing the suit, this Court

stated in dicta:
Their rights, if any they have, are against the
general partner and not the sellers, who simply

-8-

repossessed the property for failure of all parties to
pay as provided in the original contract of sale.
We have a statute which provides: MA contributor,
unless he is a general partner, is not a proper party
to proceedings by or against a partnership . . . ."
See also 60 Am. Jur. 2d, Partnership § 380.
508 P.2d at 805 (footnote omitted).
The Court's citation of authority is also significant to
the instant analysis.

The authority cited provides that the

rights of a limited partner are confined to the rights
specifically enumerated in the Limited Partnership Act, to have
full information and receive a share of the income, and to have
the same rights as a general partner in dissolution and winding
up by decree of a court.

See 60 Am. Jur. 2d, Partnership,

§ 380.
Thus in Empire Investment, this Court applied the rule that
where an entity is created by statute, the court will not
confer powers; the only proper inference being that the legislature intended that no other or greater powers were given than
those specified.

This rule is particularly applicable where

the powers sought to be conferred actually conflict with the
existing statutory scheme.
C.

Analogies to the Law of Corporate Shareholders are
Inapposite in the Instant Case.

As noted above, plaintiffs argue that this Court should go
beyond the statutory parameters of the Utah Limited Partnership
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Act and, contrary to its express provisions, find a common law
right to bring a derivative action by analogizing to rights
accorded corporate shareholders and cestuis que trust.

In

Jaffe v. Harris, 109 Mich. App. 786, 312 N.W.2d 381 (1981), the
court stated:
Such analogies simply are not applicable to provide
powers not expressly granted by the legislature
regardless of our own notions of policy or equity. It
is indeed significant to note that the Michigan
Legislature has conferred statutorily the rights to
bring derivative actions to shareholders of Michigan's
corporations. Such a specific conferment to corporate
shareholders not only indicates that the Legislature
was fully aware of derivative rights, but further
underscores the intent of the legislature not to
provide such rights to limited partners. Moreover,
the Michigan Legislature in enacting the corporate
shareholders derivative provision has demonstrated its
intent that such a right must be granted by statute to
a statutory creature such as a corporation or a
limited partnership.
312 N.W.2d at 386, 387 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
Not only are such analogies inapplicable where an entity is
created by statute with specific powers expressly conferred by
the Legislature, but there are material differences between
corporate shareholders and limited partners. Most significantly, a derivative action by corporate shareholders is needed
because a corporate shareholder cannot bring a direct action
against directors for mismanagement.

The director's fiduciary

duty runs to the corporation, not to the shareholder.

Because

the corporation owns the claim, the shareholder may bring suit

-10-

only on its behalf.

The derivative action is literally the

only remedy.
By contrast, the limited partner has a number of remedies
consistent with the nature of the limited partnership that
obviate the need for a derivative action.

For example, unlike

the corporate shareholder, a limited partner can create
remedies to protect his interest by requiring specific provisions in the Limited Partnership Agreement.*
Similarly, although limited partners give up the right to
control the partnership in exchange for limited liability by
entering into the Limited Partnership agreement, they are
granted a direct right by statute to sue a general partner who
has breached duties owed to the limited partners.
Ann. §§ 48-2-10, 26 (1953).

Utah Code

It is thus unnecessary for a

limited partner to sue derivatively because the partner can sue
directly for removal or breach of duty, and can seek other
relief by way of mandatory injunction to require the general
partner to enforce rights of the partnership vis-a-vis third
parties.

4

In this case it is significant that the limited partnership
agreement provides in section 18.1 that "upon a vote of the
parties holding more than 75% of the then outstanding units,
the general partner may be expelled from the partnership with
or without cause." Since plaintiffs own more than 75% of the
outstanding units, they could expel the general partner at any
time and sue that entity directly for wrongdoing, without
benefit of a derivative action.
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Plaintiffs in this case are not in the same position as a
corporate shareholder, who, without a derivative action must
suffer in silence when a wrong occurs.

The limited partner/

plaintiffs in this case, have an abundance of remedies available.

The analogy to corporate law is thus inappropriate.

D.

Sound Policy Supports The Law as It Currently Exists.

As previously noted, the Utah Limited Partnership Act
provides limited liability for limited partners unless the
limited partner takes part in the control or management of the
partnership.

Utah Code. Ann. § 48-2-7 (1953).

Control of the

business for which the general partner has unlimited liability
is a fundamental tenet of limited partnership law.
Daines, 567 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977).

Harline v.

However, to graft a common

law right to bring a derivative action on behalf of the limited
partnership onto the current law subverts the whole statutory
scheme by radically increasing the power of limited partners to
participate in control and management of the partnership
without a corresponding increase in responsibility or potential
liability.

Unlike the corporate shareholder, there are no

statutory controls or bond requirements governing derivative
suits by limited partners.

To recognize a derivative action

the limited partnership context allows a limited partner to
substitute its business judgment for that of the general
partner.
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i

Current law protects the rights of a limited partner by
allowing a direct right of action against the general partner.
At the same time the current statutory scheme requires a
threshold determination by the courts that the general partner
has violated the business judgment rule in failing to act, or
in acting improperly before granting relief against a general
partner.
The primary advantage of current law lies in the opportunity it provides the court to address the threshold issue of
whether a limited partner should be entitled to initiate a
lawsuit which the general partner, in the exercise of its sound
business judgment and exclusive authority has elected not to
pursue.

The "business judgment" rule is well established in

the corporate context.

See e.g. In re Reading Company, 711

F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1983) [court will not disturb judgments of
board of directors "if they can be attributed to any rational
business purpose"]; Mountain Manor Realty, Inc. v. Buccheri, 55
M.D. App. 185, 461 A.2d 45 (1983) [general rule that, with
limited exceptions, the court may not interfere or second-guess
business decisions made by directors in management of
corporation].

A similar good faith rule is implicit in the

limited partnership context.
Accordingly, it is significant in the instant case that a
viable general partner exists who has consciously decided not
to bring the claim asserted by plaintiffs, and has in fact,
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counterclaimed for acts of Gerald H. Bagley committed while he
was the general partner.

This fact alone distinguishes the

instant case from the majority of cases cited by appellants
where the reviewing court recognized a right of limited
partners to bring a derivative action.
For example, in the leading decision holding that under the
circumstances there present, a limited partner had a right to
maintain a derivative action, the court in Klebenow v. New York
Produce Association, 344 F.2d 294 (2nd Cir. 1965) stated:
We would indeed expect that the New York courts would
require strong allegations and proof of disqualification or wrongful refusal by the general partners to
sue on the partnership's behalf--a mere difference of
opinion would be nowhere near enough. But the
allegations in the instant complaint that the
partners, including the liquidating partner, have
completely divested themselves of power in favor of a
stranger who is acting on behalf of creditors . . .
meets this test.
344 F.2d at 299 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
In fact, the disability or disqualification of the general
partner was a significant factor in the court's decision to
allow a derivative action by limited partners in practically
every case cited by plaintiffs in support of their position.
See e.g. Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, 18 N.Y. 2d 540,
277 N.Y.S. 2d 386, 223 N.E. 2d 876 (1966); McCully v. Radack,
27 Md.App. 350, 340 A.2d 374 (1975); Smith v. Bader, 458
F. Supp. 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying California law); Strain
v. Seven Hills Associates, 75 A.D.2d 360, 429 N.Y.S. 2d 424
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(1980) (applying Ohio law) ; Phillips v. KULA 200, Wick Realty,
Inc., 629 P.2d 119 (Haw. App. 1981); Jaffe v. Harris, 109 Mich.
App. 786, 312 N.W. 2d 381 (1981).
264 § 6.

See also, Annot. 26 ALR 4th

Cjf. Plaintiff Appellant's Brief at pp. 40-41.s

No such disqualification is present in the instant case.
The substance of what plaintiffs allege is that a viable,
acting general partner has decided not to pursue the claims of
plaintiffs.

To allow a derivative action under these and

similar circumstances would allow a limited partner to initiate
litigation resulting in unnecessary or wasteful expenditure of
partnership assets to the detriment of both the defendants and
the limited partnership without first establishing any right to
so proceed.

The present statutory scheme, requiring proof in

court that the good faith judgment of a viable general partner
was incorrect, should not be circumvented.
In sum, for this court to recognize a right to bring a
derivative action where the legislature has not done so is
inappropriate.

The particular facts of the instant case

5

Plaintiffs argue that these cases illustrate the
limitations inherent in the common law power to bring a
derivative action. It is difficult to apprehend the logic of
this argument as applied to the facts of this case, where
plaintiffs assert that a simple allegation of self-dealing in
the complaint should be sufficient to overcome any inherent
limitation and allow them to bring a derivative action. It is
significant that corporate shareholders are subject to much
more stringent controls and bond requirements to prevent the
filing of frivolous derivative claims.
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neither present a danger of substantial injustice nor advance
any compelling policy consideration which favors assertion of
the claim.6
II.

EVEN IF PLAINTIFFS COULD BRING A DERIVATIVE ACTION, UTAH LAW DOES NOT PERMIT
JOINDER OF DIRECT AND DERIVATIVE CLAIMS
IN THE SAME ACTION AND THUS THE DERIVATIVE CLAIMS WERE CORRECTLY DISMISSED.

It has long been the law of Utah that direct and derivative
claims may not be joined in the same action.

Goodliffe v.

6

Gerald H. Bagley's status as former general partner and
guarantor of lender's debt and the fact that the current
general partner has sued him for fraud in such capacity, draws
into serious question the propriety of his being a proper
custodian of the claims under any circumstances, even if proper
standing did exist under Utah Law.
Rule 23.1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in
part: "the derivative action may not be maintained if it
appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately
represent the interest of shareholders or members similarly
situated in enforcing the rights of the corporation of
association." The complaint correctly points out that
commencing in the summer of 1982 and extending through
December, 1984, Gerald H. Bagley was general partner of Jeremy,
Ltd. Many of the allegations in the complaint relate to
occurrences within this time period. Specifically, plaintiffs
allege that delay occurred in the funding of the loan during
the later part of 1982, and that various delays occurred in the
funding of construction draws in 1983 and 1984. Those acts
occurred while Gerald Bagley was general partner of Jeremy,
Ltd. The facts alleged are sufficient to establish that Bagley
has materially different interests in the pending lawsuit than
do other limited partners of the Jeremy, Ltd. and thus does not
fairly and adequately represent those limited partners.
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Colonial Corp., 155 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah, 1945). 7
reasoning behind this rule is sound.

The

In a derivative action,

the plaintiff brings the suit as custodian of the cause of
action on behalf of the entity and all of its owners.

All such

interests are represented by the person bringing the suit and
the plaintiff stands in a fiduciary position with respect to
the others.

Id.

For plaintiff to assert separate claims for

distinctly personal relief in the same suit, is deemed to be a
conflict of interest and is not allowed.

As noted by the Utah

Supreme court in Goodliffe, supra.
Plaintiffs in this case attempt to join separate
causes of action for distinctive personal relief, in
the derivative suit, which they are not permitted to
do.

Clearly such a cause of action [personal claim for
fraud and deceit] has no place in a stockholder suit
brought for the benefit of the corporation.

165 P.2d at 182.

Accord, Fanchon and Marco, Inc. v. Paramount

Pictures, 107 F.Supp. 532, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).

7

Since Utah does not recognize a derivative section on
behalf of limited partners, the Utah case discussed herein
refers to corporate shareholder derivative actions. The
rationale is, however, applicable if a derivative action is
recognized.
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In the instant case, Gerald H. Bagley asserts personal
claims for conversion and defamation, which fall squarely
within the rule in Goodliffe that claims for "distinctive
personal relief," even though not asserted against a corporate
defendant, cannot be joined with derivative claims:
As pointed out in the Price case, supra, involving a
somewhat parallel situation: "but running through the
bills in an attempted assertion of a cause of action
against the individual defendants not for the use and
benefit of the fuel company but exclusively affecting
the complainants as individuals. It is for fraud and
deceit practiced upon in the original sale and
purchase of the stock which they hold. Clearly such a
a cause of action has no place in a stockholder's suit
brought for the benefit of the corporation.
155 P.2d at 182 (quoting Price v. Union Land Co., 187 F. 886,
889 (8th Cir. 1911)).
Plaintiffs' assert that the direct claims of Gerald H.
Bagley are "incidental" and therefore within the Goodliffe rule
because they are not "antagonistic to" the limited partnership.

However, the incidental relief in Goodliffe is substan-

tially different from the direct claims for relief that have
been asserted by Bagley in the pending lawsuit.

Goodliffe held

that the joined claims were incidental only to the extent that
they went to the ability of the former shareholders to institute or maintain a derivative suit.

To the extent plaintiffs

in Goodliffe sought relief from the individual defendants from
wrongs committed against plaintiffs as individuals, their
claims were not incidental and were improperly joined.
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155

P.2d at 182.

The fact that the individual claims did not seek

relief from the corporation was not controlling.
CONCLUSION
Appellants lack standing to prosecute the derivative
aspects of this lawsuit.

For the reasons set forth above,

respondent Lenders respectfully request the court to affirm the
Judgment of Dismissal entered by the Court below.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of March, 1987.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

George A. HuYt
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